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Abstract 
Domestic airlines’ reliance on frequent flier programs to improve sales is called into question by the 
double jeopardy effect. Data on airline travel from D.K. Shifflet indicate that small domestic airlines suffer 
from both weak penetration and a meager average purchase frequency, while large domestic airlines 
enjoy an advantage in both penetration and average purchase frequency. In addition, there is much more 
variance in penetration among domestic airlines than is found in average purchase frequency. Thus, 
differences between airlines in sales or market share are almost entirely due to differences in penetration 
rather than differences in purchase frequency. This “double jeopardy” pattern of data, in which small 
brands suffer in two ways, has been observed for many different product categories and in many different 
countries. The ubiquity of this effect suggests that average purchase frequency among brand users 
cannot be increased substantially without also increasing the brand’s penetration. Thus, hospitality 
marketers who focus on loyalty programs for competitive advantage will be disappointed (although such 
programs constitute a defensive strategy at this point). Instead of targeting current users in an attempt to 
increase their frequency of purchase, hospitality and other marketers should focus on increasing the 
popularity of their brands among the market as a whole. Ultimately, successful marketing comes not from 
loyalty programs, but from creating value in the form of a superior product and service offering, 
communicating that value to all users of the product category, and capturing that value through pricing. 
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executive SuMMAry
D
omestic airlines’ reliance on frequent flier programs to improve sales is called into question 
by the double jeopardy effect. Data on airline travel from D.K. Shifflet indicate that small 
domestic airlines suffer from both weak penetration and a meager average purchase 
frequency, while large domestic airlines enjoy an advantage in both penetration and 
average purchase frequency. In addition, there is much more variance in penetration among domestic 
airlines than is found in average purchase frequency. Thus, differences between airlines in sales or 
market share are almost entirely due to differences in penetration rather than differences in purchase 
frequency. This “double jeopardy” pattern of data, in which small brands suffer in two ways, has been 
observed for many different product categories and in many different countries. The ubiquity of this 
effect suggests that average purchase frequency among brand users cannot be increased substantially 
without also increasing the brand’s penetration. Thus, hospitality marketers who focus on loyalty 
programs for competitive advantage will be disappointed (although such programs constitute a 
defensive strategy at this point). Instead of targeting current users in an attempt to increase their 
frequency of purchase, hospitality and other marketers should focus on increasing the popularity of 
their brands among the market as a whole. Ultimately, successful marketing comes not from loyalty 
programs, but from creating value in the form of a superior product and service offering, communicating 
that value to all users of the product category, and capturing that value through pricing.
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corneLL hoSpitALity report
Marketers can increase sales of their products in two ways. They can induce non-users of their product to try, buy, and use it (known as a penetration strategy), or they can induce current users of their product to buy and use it more often (called a frequency strategy). Retail companies have pursued frequency strategies 
for a long time based on the idea that existing, loyal customers are the most profitable. A classic example 
of a technique for increasing repeat purchases is trading stamps (notably, S&H Green Stamps), which 
offered merchandise as a reward for patronage.1 Although Green Stamps began a long fade with the 
1970s’ petroleum-market turbulence, the focus on the frequency strategy has intensified in the past few 
years, with the rise of loyalty programs. 
1 “History of Loyalty Programs,” www.frequentflier.com/ffp-005.htm, on 2/3/08. The Green Stamps concept still exists in electronic form, as S&H Green 
Points.
Frequency Strategies and Double 
Jeopardy in Marketing:
The Pitfall of Relying on Loyalty Programs
by Michael Lynn, Ph.D.
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Marketers have focused on building loyalty because 
the proliferation of alternative media outlets in print, radio, 
television, and the internet has fractured the media market 
and made mass market penetration strategies costly and dif-
ficult to execute. Moreover, marketing data made available 
by information technology has revealed that a handful of 
“heavy users” accounts for a disproportionate share of most 
businesses’ sales. Further, these heavy users tend not to be 
brand loyal, which suggests that the opportunity to promote 
increased patronage from these heavy users is a particularly 
promising one.2 Together, these and other forces have led 
marketers to increasingly focus on frequency strategies.3 
Nowhere is the marketing emphasis on frequency strat-
egies more intense than in the tourism industry. American 
Airlines led the tourism industry’s interest in frequency 
strategies in the 1980s when its executives came to believe 
that they could increase their share of the lucrative but 
fickle heavy flyer segment by offering rewards tied to repeat 
patronage. Since then, the world’s airlines have created over 
70 frequent flyer programs that collectively have over 100 
million members and give away 10 million rewards a year. 
Other travel-related companies, notably lodging chains, 
were quick to copy these efforts, so that frequency or loyalty 
2 G. Hallberg, All Consumers Are Not Created Equal (New York: John 
Wiley & Sons, 1995).
3 “History of Loyalty Programs,” loc.cit.
programs have become commonplace in hotels, car rental 
firms, and even restaurants.4 
Given the considerable effort and expense invested in 
frequency programs, hospitality marketers should critically 
examine the relative merits of penetration and frequency 
strategies. In this report, I examine one facet of this issue 
by describing a well established but little known empirical 
market regularity called market double jeopardy, which 
characterizes the correlation of penetration and purchase 
frequency. In that context, I discuss the implications of this 
phenomenon for the viability of relying on either penetra-
tion or frequency strategies in marketing.5 I focus on airlines, 
using data provided by D.K. Shifflet, but the principle applies 
equally to other travel firms that employ frequency pro-
grams, including hotels. 
Double Jeopardy in Marketing
When looking at the brands in a product category, brand 
penetration and buyers’ average purchase frequency tend to 
be positively correlated. In other words, small brands suf-
fer not only from a small penetration (since they are small 
brands), but also a relatively low average purchase frequency 
among those who do buy those brands. Conversely, large 
4 Ibid.
5 A. Ehrenberg and G. Goodhardt, “Double Jeopardy Revisited, Again,” 
Marketing Research, Spring 2002, pp. 40–42.
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Explanation of the “Double Jeopardy” Effect
As mentioned in the text, mathematical analyses prove that double jeopardy will occur whenever (1) the proportion of consumers who buy a 
brand in any given time period is independent of whether they also buy another brand, and (2) brands do not differ substantially in how often 
their customers buy the product category (that is, no brands disproportionately attract heavy users). To understand why these conditions lead to 
double jeopardy, consider a hypothetical market in which 100 consumers buy a product twice a year and choose between one of two brands , A 
and B. The probability that a consumer will buy A is 0.6 and the probability of buying B is 0.4. This is an overly simplified (or restrictive) case in 
that there are no differences among consumers in either brand preferences or average number of purchases in the category. These unrealistic 
simplifications make it easier to see why double jeopardy occurs, but are not necessary for the effect. The critical elements of this case are that 
(1) the proportion of consumers who buy Brand A or Brand B is independent of which brand they purchased previously, and (2) the average 
category purchase frequency of consumers who buy Brand A is similar to that of consumers who buy Brand B.  
In this case, Brand A will have:
• total yearly sales of 120 units (100 people x 2 purchases x .6 probability of purchase = 120 units), 
• per-capita sales of 1.2 units (120 units/100 consumers = 1.2 units per consumer), 
• 84 customers who buy it at least once 
[(100 consumers x .6 probability of 
purchase = 60 customers buying the 
brand for first purchase) + (40 consumers 
who bought Brand B first x .6 probability 
of purchase = 24 additional customers 
buying the brand for second purchase) = 
84 customers buying the brand at least 
once],
• 36 customers who buy it twice (100 
consumers x .6 probability of first 
purchase x .6 probability of second purchase = 36 customers buying the brand twice),
• 48 customers who buy it once and its competitor once (84 customers who buy it at least once – 36 customers who buy it twice = 48 
customers who buy it only once), and 
• an average of 1.43 yearly purchases per buyer of the brand (120 total sales/84 customers buying at least once = 1.43 purchases per buyer of 
the brand).
Similarly, Brand B will have:
• total yearly sales of 80 units (100 people x 2 purchases x .4 probability of purchase = 80 units), 
• per-capita sales of 0.8 units (80 units/100 consumers = 0.80 units per consumer), 
Graphic presentation of hypothetical case illustrating the statistical basis 
for double jeopardy effects
36 Consumers Purchase Brand 
A Twice
48 Consumers Purchase Brand A & 
Brand B Once
16 Consumers 
Purchase Brand 
B Twice
Penetration of Brand A: 84 consumers
Penetration of Brand B: 64 consumers
brands enjoy their penetration advantage but also have a 
greater average purchase frequency than do small brands. 
This tendency for small brands to suffer in two ways is 
known as double jeopardy. As Ehrenberg, Goodhardt, and 
Barwise point out, evidence of double jeopardy extends to 
over 50 different common product categories, including 
breakfast cereals, gasoline, and toilet soap. It has been docu-
mented in many international markets, including the United 
Kingdom, continental Europe, and Japan, as well as in the 
United States.6 Importantly, data showing double jeopardy 
also indicate that brand differences in penetration are much 
larger than brand differences in average purchase frequency. 
6 A.A.C. Ehrenberg, G.J. Goodhardt, T.P. and Barwise, “Double Jeopardy 
Revisited,” Journal of Marketing, Vol. 54 (July 1990), p. 83.
Double jeopardy is a statistical consequence of two 
fairly common conditions. Mathematical analyses prove 
that double jeopardy will occur whenever the following 
conditions exist: (1) the proportion of consumers who buy 
a brand in any given time period is independent of whether 
they also buy another brand, and (2) brands do not differ 
substantially in how often their customers buy the prod-
uct category—that is, no brand disproportionately attracts 
heavy users. The box on this page and the next offers a more 
detailed discussion of this point. Both assumptions of that 
mathematical model—that is, of independent probabilities 
of brand purchase and of equivalent proportions of heavy 
users across brands—hold in real life.7
7 Ibid.
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hypothetical case illustrating the statistical basis for double jeopardy effects
brand
no.  of 
consumers
yearly 
purchases 
of each 
consumer
probability 
of 
purchasing 
total 
Sales
per-capita 
Sales
no. buying 
at Least 
once
no. buying 
twice
no. 
Splitting 
purchases 
between 
brands
Average 
yearly 
purchases 
per buyer 
of brand
A 100 2 .6 120 1.2 84 36 48 1.43
B 100 2 .4 80 0.8 64 16 48 1.25
 Note: This hypothetical example is modified from: A.A.C. Ehrenberg, G.J. Goodhardt, T.P. and Barwise, “Double Jeopardy Revisited,” Journal of Marketing, Vol. 54  
(July 1990), pp. 82–91.
Practical Implications
The widely observed positive correlation between brand 
penetration and average purchase frequency among brand 
users together with the greater variability in penetration 
than in purchase frequency implies to some marketers that 
average purchase frequency among brand users cannot be 
increased substantially without also increasing the brands’ 
penetration.8 By this logic, increases in brand penetration 
are unlikely to occur without accompanying small increases 
in average purchase frequency among users. Thus, according 
to proponents of this view, neither exclusive frequency strat-
egies nor exclusive penetration strategies are possible. These 
marketers claim that marketing efforts should be directed 
8 Ibid.
at increasing the popularity of the brand among users and 
non-users alike.
Proponents of frequency programs may counter-argue 
that widespread evidence of marketing double jeopardy 
means only that few brands have achieved a disproportionate 
share of heavy users. Double jeopardy results from that fail-
ure to attract disproportionate numbers of heavy users, but it 
does not mean that brands are unable to attract those heavy 
users. By that logic, judicious use of frequency programs 
should attract a disproportionate share of heavy users. The 
problem with this counterargument is in its implication that 
double jeopardy should not be found in industry segments 
with strong frequency programs, because the phenomenon 
remains in those industries. In the sections that follow, I 
demonstrate that airlines which serve the U.S. market have 
• 64 customers who buy it at least once [(100 consumers x .4 probability of purchase = 40 customers buying the brand for first purchase) + (60 
consumers who bought Brand B first x .4 probability of purchase = 24 additional customers buying the brand for second purchase) = 64 
customers buying the brand at least once],
• 16 customers who buy it twice  (100 consumers x .4 probability of first purchase x .4 probability of second purchase = 16 customers buying 
the brand twice),
• 48 customers who buy it once and its competitor once (64 customers who buy it at least once – 16 customers who buy it twice = 48 
customers who buy it only once), and 
• an average of 1.25 yearly purchases per buyer of the brand (80 total sales/64 customers buying at least once = 1.25 purchases per buyer of 
the brand).
These calculations are summarized in the table above. Notice that Brand B, with the lower probability of purchase, has both the lower number 
of customers buying it at least once (penetration) and the lower average yearly purchases per buyer of the brand (average purchase frequency 
among its buyers), thereby exhibiting a double jeopardy effect. Furthermore, Brand B’s penetration is only 76 percent of Brand A’s while Brand 
B’s average purchase frequency among its buyers is 87 percent of Brand A’s, reflecting greater variability across brands in penetration than in 
average purchase frequency among brand buyers. 
The graphical presentation of the same hypothetical case demonstrates the relative size of the two brands’ markets. You can see from this graph 
that Brand B, which has the smallest penetration will also have the smallest average purchase frequency among its buyers—the double jeopardy 
effect—because a smaller percentage of its customers buy it twice.—W.M.L.
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not been able to offset the double jeopardy effect despite their 
heavy use of frequency programs.
Data
D.K. Shifflet, a friend of the Cornell Center for Hospital-
ity Research, provided data from surveys it sends to 45,000 
households each month asking for information about each 
overnight and day trip (over 50 miles from home) completed 
in the prior three months. When a household was included in 
the survey more than once, I used only the data from its most 
recent survey record. I excluded from the analysis airlines 
with records from fewer than 75 customers, leaving a total of 
twenty-three airlines serving domestic airports. The resulting 
data set comprised 59,882 air trips completed in 2002, 2003, 
Exhibit 1
purchase data from twenty-three airlines.
 
   Airline
Number of 
Customers
 
Penetration
 Purchase 
Frequency
Market 
 Share
   Travel 
Frequency
A 5100 .172 1.41 .156 1.70
B 4740 .160 1.42 .147 1.74
C 4290 .145 1.34 .125 1.62
D 3621 .122 1.50 .119 1.84
E 3016 .102 1.40 .092 1.65
F 2785 .094 1.33 .081 1.63
G 2165 .073 1.40 .066 1.73
H 1068 .036 1.29 .030 1.66
I 862 .029 1.32 .025 1.68
J 643 .022 1.26 .018 1.62
K 588 .020 1.22 .016 1.52
L 526 .018 1.33 .015 1.61
M 307 .010 1.18 .008 1.59
N 272 .009 1.27 .008 1.46
O 227 .008 1.30 .006 1.65
P* 191 .006 1.77 .007 2.07
Q 149 .005 1.15 .004 1.48
R* 141 .005 2.12 .007 2.60
S 112 .004 1.14 .003 1.32
T* 100 .003 1.60 .003 2.23
U* 87 .003 1.86 .004 2.30
V 79 .003 1.24 .002 1.61
W 78 .003 1.19 .002 1.56
* Note: These airlines are foreign flag carriers.
or 2004 by a sample of 29,620 U.S. 
consumers. This information was 
used to calculate the following 
variables for each of the twenty-
three airlines in the final data set:
• penetration (the proportion of all 
airline customers who had flown 
on that airline at least once),
• purchase frequency (the average 
number of times that particular 
airline’s customers had flown on 
the airline),
• market share (the airline’s 
proportionate share of all flights 
taken), and
• travel frequency (the average 
number of trips involving air-
plane travel taken by the airline’s 
customers).
These data are listed in Exhibit 
1. Airlines are identified only by 
letter because disguising the data 
was a condition for obtaining the 
data from D.K. Shifflet. While I 
cannot link the names with any 
performance measure, I am al-
lowed to state the set of airlines. 
They are Air Canada, Air France, 
Alaska, American, America 
Trans Air, America West, British 
Air, Continental, Delta, Frontier, 
Hawaiian, Horizon, Jet Blue, Luf-
thansa, Midwest Express, North-
west, Song, Southwest, Spirit, Sun 
Country, United, US Airways, and 
Value Jet. (Again, this is not the 
order presented in the table.)
Results
Penetration for the twenty-three airlines as a group was 
not correlated with purchase frequency (r = -.02, p = .95). 
However, as can be seen in Exhibit 2, except for four outly-
ing values these airlines display a positive relationship be-
tween these variables. Those four outlying cases all involve 
foreign airlines, Airlines P, R, T, and U, that primarily serve 
international travelers and enjoy advantages in serving 
those markets that the domestic airlines do not. Among 
the nineteen domestic airlines, on the other hand, penetra-
tion was strongly and positively correlated with purchase 
frequency (r = .80, p < .001). In addition, there was much 
more variance in penetration, which ranged from .003 to 
  nu ber of  purchase Market travel 
 Airline customers penetration Frequency Share Frequency
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.172 among domestic airlines, than in purchase frequency, 
which ranged from 1.14 to 1.50. Thus, double jeopardy exists 
among domestic airlines in the United States, despite their 
widespread use of loyalty programs.
To restate the case, double jeopardy is possible when 
brands do not differ substantially in how often their custom-
ers buy the product category. That is, if no brands dispropor-
tionately attract heavy users the foundation is set for double 
jeopardy. An examination of the table in Exhibit 1 reveals 
that condition to be largely met in the case of U.S. domestic 
airlines. The average travel frequency among the domestic 
airlines was 1.61 with a standard deviation of only 0.11 and 
a range from 1.32 to 1.84. Data for two airlines fall outside 
those averages. Airline D attracts a slightly higher propor-
tion of heavy users than does its competitors, as reflected 
in an average travel frequency among its passengers of 1.84 
(1.96 standard deviations above the mean), and airline S 
attracts a slightly smaller than typical proportion of heavy 
users, as reflected in an average travel frequency among 
its passengers of 1.32 (2.56 standard deviations below the 
mean). However, apart from these cases, the differences be-
tween domestic airlines in average travel frequency among 
each airline’s passengers are minuscule. 
By contrast, the considerable variability in airlines’ 
penetration as compared to average purchase frequency, 
suggests that differences in airlines’ market share are more 
strongly affected by penetration than by purchase frequency. 
Indeed, these data show that market share among the do-
mestic airlines was more highly correlated with penetration 
(r = .999, p < .001) than with purchase frequency (r = .80, 
p < .001). A regression of market share on penetration and 
purchase frequency indicated that although each accounted 
for unique variance in market share, penetration was by far 
responsible for more variance (penetration: part r = .59, ß= 
.97, t (16) = 53.74, p < .001; purchase frequency: part r = .03, 
ß = .04, t (16) = 2.29, p < .04). A graph of the relationship 
between market share and penetration (Exhibit 3) shows 
that only Airline D has a noticeably larger market share than 
its penetration would predict and even that deviation from 
expectations is small. Clearly, differences in market share 
between domestic airlines in the U.S. are primarily attribut-
able to differences in penetration.
Conclusions
Despite longstanding and strong frequency programs in the 
airline industry, the domestic airlines in the United States 
are subject to double jeopardy. Airlines with small penetra-
tion levels also suffer from lower average purchase frequen-
cies among buyers. The fairly small differences between 
airlines in average purchase frequencies are what one would 
expect, given their large differences in penetration levels. No 
airline, with the possible exception of Airline D, has been 
successful in attracting a disproportionate share of frequent 
fliers. As a result, differences between airlines in sales or 
market share are almost entirely attributable to differences in 
penetration. Even Airline D, which has the largest propor-
tion of frequent flyers among its customers, has market share 
only 5 percent greater than expected given its penetration 
level. I must conclude that despite the wide distribution of 
frequent flier programs, those loyalty programs have failed 
to improve domestic airlines’ traffic. In short, a frequency 
strategy has not been successful in expanding sales for 
United States-based carriers.
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for 23 airlines.
Exhibit 2
relationship of penetration and average pruchase 
frequency for 23 airlines
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Exhibit 3
relationship of share of flights and penetration for 
19 u.S.-based airlines
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Drawing conclusions about the relative merits of pen-
etration and frequency strategies from these findings would 
be perilous if they stood alone. However, these findings 
reflect those of other industries. As previously mentioned, 
marketing double jeopardy is an empirical regularity that 
has been observed for over fifty different product categories 
and in several different nations. The ubiquity of double jeop-
ardy, which is evident even in the face of frequent customer 
programs offered by retail and airline industries, suggests 
that frequency strategies are impractical as a means of gain-
ing disproportionate market share. That is to say, marketers 
have not substantially increased their current buyers’ fre-
quency of purchase in the long term without also increasing 
the penetration of their brands.
I am not, however, saying that hospitality marketers 
should abandon their loyalty programs. It seems likely that 
loyalty programs may be necessary as defensive measures to 
prevent the loss of market share to competitors with similar 
programs.9 In competitive markets, frequency programs can 
and will be copied so that they are unlikely to provide a sub-
9 “History of Loyalty Programs,” loc.cit.
stantial, long-term increase in average purchase frequency or 
market share. Thus, my point is that loyalty programs should 
not be a primary focus of marketing efforts, even though 
they also should not be abandoned.
The two ways to increase sales that I have discussed 
here—namely, increasing penetration and increasing pur-
chase frequency among current users—cannot be effectively 
pursued independently. Marketing success comes from in-
creasing a brand’s popularity, which can be expected to have 
a large effect on penetration and a smaller effect on average 
purchase frequency. Thus, rather than focus on targeting 
current users in an attempt to increase their frequency of 
purchase, hospitality and other marketers should focus on 
increasing the popularity of their brands among the market 
as a whole. The lesson of this study is that successful market-
ing comes not from loyalty programs, but from creating 
value in the form of a superior product and service offer-
ing, communicating that value to all users of the product 
category, and capturing that value through pricing.10 n
10 This language borrows from a Harvard Business School model of mar-
keting that can be found in: A.J. Silk, What Is Marketing (Boston: Harvard 
Business School Press, 2006).
The ubiquity of marketing 
double jeopardy suggests that 
frequency strategies alone 
are impractical as a means 
of gaining disproportionate 
market share.
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